restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  mpleted by: Election Expert 3  ta extracted.  what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
rks						
SIDER ATTACKS					_	<u> </u>
Attacks Against VRDB	5	5	25	80	15	5
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;						
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	1	5	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);						
Attacks to Voting Access	0	1	10	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration rejections; Intentional addition of confusing language on registration form and instructions;		•			•	
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of registration activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of registration materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to register;		•			•	
Attacks Against Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake registration forms and instructions;						
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;						

restricted to paper ballots transmitted by think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable it have						IMPACT ext of a Feder ne threat is re ntage of the t w, medium, a umbers shoul	alized, time would nd high
Voting Step:	REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Registration	Packets	0	1	5	90	7	3
	registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional asmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration						
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Registration F	rackets	0	1	10	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed re	registration packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration gistration packets at the LEO;						
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Rejections		0	1	3	90	7	3
	n rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of he voters; Intentional addition of fake registration rejections during transmission from						
UTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance		0	3	10	85	10	5
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious or outdated information);	utsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement,						
Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms		10	25	80	85	10	5
Types of threat vectors: Coerced registration; Masqueraded	registration; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible registration;						

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Election Expert 3  Election Expert 3  [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)					In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT				IMPACT ext of a Feder ne threat is re ntage of the t w, medium, a umbers shoul	alized, ime would nd high
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High					
INTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS											
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE											
Errors in VRDB	1	5	15	90	7	3					
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;											
Errors in Voter's Assistance	1	5	20	90	7	3					
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					,	3					
Errors in Registration Forms and Instructions	1	5	15	90	7	3					
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous registration forms and instructions;											
Errors in Processing Completed Registration Packets	1	5	15	90	7	3					
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO;	e			30							
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS											
Errors in Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	1	10	20	90	7	3					
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;											

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what perce think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs vide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this ti AND have an o sost likely] pere t this estimate imum] % and d %." (numbers n to 100)	I election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal elect assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time wit have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Errors in Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	1	10	20	90	7	3	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packet during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;							
Errors in Transmission of Registration Rejections	1	5	10	95	4	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters;	om						
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION							
Errors in Voting Access	5	20	50	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of registration form and instructions;							
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	10	40	80	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;							
Errors in Registration Application	10	40	80	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Registration packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Registration for lost or damaged; Registration packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;	orm						
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	10	40	80	70	25	5	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the thi realized ANI effect? Prov maximum vi of values as be realized in effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	citkeLihoo  at of a Federa  atage of the til  reat would be  b have an obse  ide minimum  alues. Interpre  "I think this th  AND have an obset likely] pero  at this estimate  mum] % and a  %." (numbers  at o 100)	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range arreat would observeable tent (%) of a could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time woul it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)		
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Disruptions by Environmental Events	5	15	25	85	10	5
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	5	15	25	85	10	5
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;						

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percei think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOO ext of a Federa ntage of the tir reat would be D have an obs- i'lde minimum alues. Interpre "I'l think this ti AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	I election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable eent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
TTACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS		_					
Attacks Against VRDB	0	2	10	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;							
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	1	5	90	7	3	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					•	3	
Attacks to Voting Access	0	1	5	90	7	3	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request rejections; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballots; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of confusing language on instructions for marked ballot return;							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	90	7	3	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;							
Attacks Against Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	3	10	90	7	3	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions;							

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percei think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOC ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs i'de minimum alues. Interpre "I' think this ti AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	el election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	1	3	10	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	1	3	10	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;								
Attacks During Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	5	95	4	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake rejections of absentee ballot requests during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Attacks Against Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	1	3	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballots and instructions;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	3	7	15	90	7	3		

THREAT VECTORS  VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percei think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [mithe time but low as [mini	LIKELIHOO  ext of a Federa ratage of the til reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpre "I think this th AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	I election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable eent (%) of e could be as as high as	In the conte assuming the what perce it have a low impact? (no 100)	ealized, time would and high	
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					•	
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	3	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;				30	,	
Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests	10	25	50	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Coerced absentee ballot request; Masqueraded absentee ballot request; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible absentee ballot request;						
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
Errors in VRDB	3	7	15	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;						
Errors in Voter's Assistance	10	20	50	80	15	5
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					10	
Errors in Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	1	5	10	90	7	3
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions;						
Errors in Processing Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	1	3	10	90	7	3

THREAT VECTORS  VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percei think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOO ext of a Federa ntage of the tir reat would be D have an obs vide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this ti AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable eent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;								
Errors in Absentee Ballots and Instructions	10	25	40	80	15	5		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballots and instructions;								
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	1	3	10	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Errors in Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	1	5	15	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Errors in Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	1	3	5	95	4	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION								
Errors in Voting Access	10	25	50	80	15	5		

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the the realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v. of values as be realized a effect in [months] time but low as [mini	LIKELIHOO  ext of a Federa ntage of the til reat would be D have an obs- ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this th AND have an o ost likely] pero st this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	I election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range nreat would observeable eent (%) of could be as as high as	In the conte assuming th what perce it have a lov impact? (no 100)	alized, ime would nd high	
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot request form and instructions;						
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	10	25	50	80	15	5
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;						
Errors in Absentee Ballot Requests	5	15	30	80	15	5
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request form; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot request form lost or damaged; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;						
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
Disruptions by Natural Events	20	40	60	70	20	10
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;						
Disruptions by Environmental Events	10	25	40	70	20	10
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	20	40	60	70	20	10
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;						

THREAT VECTORS		IKELIHOO	ND.	IMPACT					
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v. of values as be realized effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	xt of a Federa trage of the tile reat would be to have an obside minimum alues. Interpretin think this the AND have an cost likely] percet this estimate mum] % and a well and a section of the section o	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range areat would observeable eent (%) of could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)					
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
ATTACKS									
INSIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks by Denial of Service	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;									
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballots and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;									
OUTSIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks by Denial of Service	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;				30	,	<u> </u>			
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS									
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS									
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	3	5	10	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;									
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events	5	15	25	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;									

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the thine realized ANI effect? Prov maximum violations as be realized as effect in [months] the time but low as [mini	at of a Federa tage of the til reat would be D have an obside minimum all think this til "I think this til AND have an obst likely] pero to this estimate mum] % and a %." (numbers to 100)	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range arreat would observeable tent (%) of could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time woul it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Disruptions by Environmental Events	5	15	25	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	5	15	25	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD IMPACT								
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percei think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu- low as [mini	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpri "I think this tl AND have an o ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of could be as as high as	In the context of a Federal electi assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time wo it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum t e d e					
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
ATTACKS									
OUTSIDER ATTACKS					_				
Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms	3	5	15	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Coerced vote; Masqueraded vote; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible vote;									
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS									
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION	_								
Errors in Voting Access	5	15	30	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot and instructions;									
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	5	10	20	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;									
Errors in Absentee Ballot Marking	5	10	30	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Marked ballot packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot lost or damaged; Marked ballot packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO; Marked ballot packet not transmitted to LEO;									
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events	5	15	25	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;									
Disruptions by Environmental Events	5	15	25	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;									

THREAT VECTORS  VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percei think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpre "I think this ti AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, me do you e most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	assuming the what perce it have a lov	IMPACT ext of a Feder ne threat is re ntage of the t w, medium, a umbers shoul	ral election, ealized, time would and high
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events  Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;	5	15	25	90	7	3

THREAT VECTORS		IVELILIO	20	IMPACT						
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3	VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component postal mail, with no electronic component effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think the threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think the threat of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think the threat of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think the threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think the threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think the threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect?					ext of a Federal election, the threat is realized, ntage of the time would w, medium, and high				
Data extracted.	low as [min	imum] % and %." (number	as high as							
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum Most Likely Maximum			Low	Medium	High				
ATTACKS										
INSIDER ATTACKS										
Attacks by Denial of Service	1	3	5	90	7	3				
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots from voter to LEO;										
Attacks During Transmission of Marked Ballots Packets	1	3	10	90	7	3				
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from LEO to the voters;										
OUTSIDER ATTACKS										
Attacks by Denial of Service	1	3	10	90	7	3				
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots;										
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS										
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS										
Errors in Transmission of Marked Ballot Packets	3	7	15	90	7	3				
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters;										
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS										
Disruptions by Natural Events	5	10	15	90	7	3				
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;										

restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v. of values as be realized effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	D have an obide minimun alues. Interpuller I think this AND have an ost likely] per this estimat mum] % and %." (number	al election, ime do you e most likely servable n and ret this range threat would observeable reent (%) of the could be as as high as					
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum Most Likely Maximum			Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Environmental Events	5	10	15	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;		_						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events  Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;	5	10	15	90	7	3		

THREAT VECTORS  VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the contex what percent think the thre realized AND effect? Provio maximum val of values as " be realized A effect in [most the time but low as [minin [maximum] % need to sum	tage of the ti eat would be have an obs de minimum lues. Interpre I think this t ND have an est likely] pere this estimate num] % and 6." (numbers	al election, me do you e most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against VRDB	0	1	5	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of processing of marked ballots at LEO;				90	,	3		
Attacks Against Processing of Returned Ballots	1	3	10	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets at the LEO;								
Attacks Against Tabulation	1	5	10	80	15	5		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional subversion of the counting process; Intentional subversion of the validation process; Intentional destruction of tabulated results; Intentional subversion of the tabulated results;								
Attacks Against Adjudication	3	10	20	80	15	5		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional refusal of legitimate ballots; Intentional acceptance of invalid ballots; Intentional misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	1	3	5	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of marked ballot processing and tabulation activities at LEO;					•			

THREAT VECTORS  VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what perceithink the threalized AN effect? Proving a values as be realized effect in [m the time bullow as [min]	LIKELIHOC ext of a Federa ntage of the ti rreat would be D have an obs vide minimum alues. Interpr "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum t 100)					
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS									
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE									
Errors in VRDB	2	5	10	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;						-			
Errors in Processing of Returned Ballots	2	5	10	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;									
Errors in Tabulation	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Errors in counting process; Errors in validation process; Accidental loss of tabulated results; Accidental destruction of tabulated results; Errors in publication of tabulated results;									
Errors in Adjudication	5	15	25	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental refusal of legitimate ballots; Accidental acceptance of invalid ballots; Accidental misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;									
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events	3	10	15	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;									
Disruptions by Environmental Events	3	10	20	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;									
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	3	10	20	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	)D	IMPACT					
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the conte what percer think the thi realized ANI effect? Prov maximum va of values as	xt of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be O have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpro "I think this tl	Il election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would	In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, ly what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to ge Id le					
Completed by: Election Expert 3 Data extracted.	effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	AND have an oper likely] peropert this estimate mum] % and a %." (numbers a to 100)	cent (%) of e could be as as high as	(%) of ld be as gh as					
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum Most Likely Maximum			Low	Medium	High			
ATTACKS									
INSIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks Against VRDB	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;									
Attacks Against Post-Election Audit	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Intentionally compromise auditors; Intentionally select audit samples non-randomly; Intentional modification of audit results; Intentional destruction of audit results;									
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS									
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE									
Errors in VRDB	2	5	10	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;									
Errors in Post-Election Audit	2	5	10	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental non-random selection of audit samples; Accidental modification of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental destruction of audit results;									
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events	1	3	5	90	7	3			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;									

VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Election Expert 3  Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the thine realized ANI effect? Prov maximum violation of values as be realized in effect in [months] the time but low as [mini	at the second of	I election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable eent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Environmental Events	1	3	5	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events  Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;	1	3	5	90	7	3		