HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what perc think the t realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [i the time bu low as [m	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have an o Provide minin values. Interpi s "I think this t AND have an most likely] pe it this estimat inimum] % an n] %." (numbed to sum to	time do you e most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce	In the context of a Federal electic assuming the threat is realized what percentage of the time wo it have a low, medium, and hig impact? (numbers should sum 100)				
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
TACKS									
INSIDER ATTACKS		,	_	_	10	00			
Attacks Against VRDB Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;	0	1	5	0	10	90			
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	1	5	10	20	70			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);									
Attacks to Voting Access	0	1	5	0	0	100			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration rejections; Intentional addition of confusing language on registration form and instructions;									
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	0	0	100			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of registration activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of registration materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to register;									
Attacks Against Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	15	20	65			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake registration forms and instructions;									
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	15	20	65			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	what percent think the trealized effect?	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have an o Provide minir values. Interpo	time do you e most likely observable num and ret this range	ne do you most likely servable m and this range eat would oserveable ent (%) of could be as as high as E DO NOT					
Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	be realized effect in [i the time bu low as [m [maximu	s "I think this in AND have an most likely] pe at this estimat inimum] % an m] %." (numbered to sum to seed to	observeable ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT						
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	0	1	5	15	20	65			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;									
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Registration Packets	0	1	5	15	20	65			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets at the LEO;									
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Rejections	0	1	5	15	20	65			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration rejections during transmission from LEO to the voters;									
OUTSIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	65	20	15			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);									
Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms	0	2	5	10	20	70			
Types of threat vectors: Coerced registration; Masqueraded registration; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible registration;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u>	what perd think the t realized effects maximum	ntext of a Fede centage of the threat would b AND have an Provide minit values. Interp	time do you le most likely observable mum and ret this range	assuming	ral election, realized, time would				
Completed by: Election Expert 2	be realized	d AND have an most likely] pe	observeable	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to					
Data extracted.	low as [m [maximu	ut this estimat ninimum] % an m] %." (numb eed to sum to	d as high as ers DO NOT		100)				
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS									
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE									
Errors in VRDB	1	5	10	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;									
Errors in Voter's Assistance	2	10	15	80	15	5			
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);									
Errors in Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous registration forms and instructions;									
Errors in Processing Completed Registration Packets	0	2	5	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO;									
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS									
Errors in Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	3	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what perc think the ti realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [i the time bu low as [m	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have and values. Interpris s "I think this AND have an most likely] po it this estimat inimum] % an m] %." (numbled to sum to	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable ercent (%) of the could be as the das high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce	In the context of a Federal ele- assuming the threat is realiz what percentage of the time v it have a low, medium, and i impact? (numbers should su 100)				
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
Errors in Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	0	1	3	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;									
Errors in Transmission of Registration Rejections	0	1	3	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters;									
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION									
Errors in Voting Access	0	1	1	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of registration form and instructions;									
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	1	3	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;									
Errors in Registration Application	0	1	3	5	10	85			
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Registration packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Registration form lost or damaged; Registration packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;									
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	1	3	25	65	10			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what perc think the ti realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [i the time bu low as [m	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have an o Provide minin values. Interpr s "I think this to AND have an most likely] pe it this estimat inimum] % an n] %." (numbed to sum to	time do you e most likely observable num and ret this range threat would observeable ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce it have a l	ral election, realized, time would , and high uld sum to		
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	what perd think the t realized effect? maximum	entage of the chreat would b AND have an Provide minit values. Interp	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range	assuming	ext of a Feder g the threat is entage of the	realized,			
Completed by: Election Expert 2	be realized	d AND have an			it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to				
Data extracted.	as [min [maximu	nis estimate co nimum] % and m] %." (numb need to sum to	ers DO NOT		100)				
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
TACKS									
INSIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks Against VRDB	0	1	5	0	10	90			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;									
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	1	5	10	20	70			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);		•							
Attacks to Voting Access	0	1	5	0	0	100			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request rejections; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballots; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of confusing language on instructions for marked ballot return;									
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	0	0	100			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;									
Attacks Against Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	15	20	65			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what perc think the t realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [m time but th as [min [maximum	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have an values. Interpo s "I think this i AND have an ost likely] perc is estimate co imum] % and m] %." (numbered to sum to	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable cent (%) of the build be as low as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce it have a	ral election, s realized, time would i, and high uld sum to			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	1	5	15	20	65		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	1	5	5	10	85		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	1	5	5	10	85		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;								
Attacks During Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	5	5	10	85		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake rejections of absentee ballot requests during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Attacks Against Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	1	1	5	10	85		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballots and instructions;						•		
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	1	5	7	25	55	20		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	DD		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what pero think the t realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [m time but th as [min [maximu	s "I think this I AND have an ost likely] perd	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable cent (%) of the ould be as low as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce it have a	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Attacks by Denial of Service	1	5	7	25	55	20		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;								
Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests	1	5	7	25	55	20		
Types of threat vectors: Coerced absentee ballot request; Masqueraded absentee ballot request; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible absentee ballot request;								
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE								
Errors in VRDB	1	5	10	75	20	5		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;								
Errors in Voter's Assistance	1	5	10	75	20	5		
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);								
Errors in Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	1	2	5	О	10	90		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions; accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions;								
Errors in Processing Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	1	3	0	10	90		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what perc think the t realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [m time but th as [min [maximum	thext of a Fede centage of the chreat would b AND have an of Provide minir values. Interpr is "I think this of d AND have an ost likely] perc nis estimate co imum] % and imn] %." (numbo	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable cent (%) of the build be as low as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what percent it have a	ext of a Fede g the threat is entage of the low, medium numbers sho 100)	realized, time would , and high		
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST		eed to sum to				10.1		
3 Francisco	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Errors in Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	1	3	0	10	90		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballots and instructions;								
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	1	3	20	55	25		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Errors in Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	1	3	20	55	25		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Errors in Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	3	75	20	5		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION								
Errors in Voting Access	0	1	1	5	10	85		
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot request form and								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2	what perc think the the realized effect? maximum of	s "I think this	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range	assuming what percent it have a	ext of a Fede g the threat is entage of the low, medium	realized, time would , and high	
Data extracted.	effect in [mo time but th as [min [maximu	ost likely] per	cent (%) of the ould be as low as high as ers DO NOT	impact? (numbers sho 100)	uld sum to	
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	1	3	5	10	85	
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;							
Errors in Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	3	5	10	85	
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request form; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot request form lost or damaged; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;							
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;			•		-		
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC)D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	what pero think the t realized effect?	entage of the centage of the hreat would b AND have an o Provide mining values. Interp	time do you e most likely observable mum and	In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized,				
Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	of values a be realized effect in [the time be low as [m [maximu	is "I think this of AND have an most likely] peut this estimat ininum] % an m] %." (numbeed to sum to	threat would observeable ercent (%) of the could be as and as high as ers DO NOT	what percentage of the time wo it have a low, medium, and hig impact? (numbers should sum 100)				
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;								
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	0	1	5	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballots and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	2	5	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;								
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	0	1	5	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	1	3	25	65	10		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D	IMPACT					
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)					realized, time would , and high			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	1	3	25	65	10			
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;		"	·						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	1	3	25	65	10			
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	of values as "I think this threat would it have a low				g the threat is	realized, time would , and high	
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms	0	5	10	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Coerced vote; Masqueraded vote; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible vote;							
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION							
Errors in Voting Access	0	1	3	15	25	65	
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot and instructions;							
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	10	25	65	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;							
Errors in Absentee Ballot Marking	1	5	15	15	65	20	
Types of threat vectors: Marked ballot packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot lost or damaged; Marked ballot packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO; Marked ballot packet not transmitted to LEO;							
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	1	3	25	65	10	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable				In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	1	3	25	65	10		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

THREAT VECTORS	L	IKELIHOO	OD OC		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	what perce think the th realized A effect? maximum v of values as be realized effect in [n the time bu low as [mi [maximum	entage of the great would b AND have an Provide mini alues. Interp "I think this AND have ar nost likely] p t this estimat nimum] % ar n] %." (numb	mum and oret this range threat would n observeable ercent (%) of te could be as nd as high as oers DO NOT	assuming	time would , and high			
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	need to sum to 100) Minimum Most Likely Maximum			Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	3	5	20	75		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots from voter to LEO;								
Attacks During Transmission of Marked Ballots Packets	0	1	3	5	20	75		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	3	5	20	75		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots;								
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Marked Ballot Packets	0	1	3	5	20	75		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	1	3	25	65	10		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								

THREAT VECTORS	L	IKELIHOO	DD	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of				tage of the time do you tat would be most likely D have an observable to wide minimum and the straight of the thire this threat would ND have an observeable st likely] percent (%) of his estimate could be as mum] % and as high as %." (numbers DO NOT			
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	1	3	25	65	10		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	1	3	25	65	10		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range				realized,	
Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	of values as "I think this threat would it			it have a	low, medium, numbers sho 100)	, and high
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
ATTACKS						
INSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks Against VRDB	0	1	5	20	65	15
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;						
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	2	35	45	20
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of processing of marked ballots at LEO;						
Attacks Against Processing of Returned Ballots	0	1	2	0	5	95
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets at the LEO;						
Attacks Against Tabulation	0	1	2	0	5	95
Types of threat vectors: Intentional subversion of the counting process; Intentional subversion of the validation process; Intentional destruction of tabulated results; Intentional subversion of the tabulated results;						
Attacks Against Adjudication	0	2	5	0	5	95
Types of threat vectors: Intentional refusal of legitimate ballots; Intentional acceptance of invalid ballots; Intentional misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;						
OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	2	35	40	25
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of marked ballot processing and tabulation activities at LEO;						

HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable."			assuming what perce it have a	ext of a Feder g the threat is entage of the low, medium numbers sho 100)	realized, time would , and high
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Minimum Most Likely Maximum			Medium	High
IINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
Errors in VRDB	0	1	2	30	45	25
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;						
Errors in Processing of Returned Ballots	0	0	1	0	2	98
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;						
Errors in Tabulation	0	1	5	0	20	80
Types of threat vectors: Errors in counting process; Errors in validation process; Accidental loss of tabulated results; Accidental destruction of tabulated results; Errors in publication of tabulated results;						
Errors in Adjudication	0	2	5	0	20	80
Types of threat vectors: Accidental refusal of legitimate ballots; Accidental acceptance of invalid ballots; Accidental misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;						
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	1	60	30	10
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;						
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	1	10	45	45
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	1	10	45	45
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;						

THREAT VECTORS	ı	LIKELIHOC	DD	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range					realized, time would		
Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	be realized AND have an effect in [most likely] po the time but this estimat low as [minimum] % ar [maximum] %." (numb need to sum to			impact? (numbers sho 100)	uld sum to		
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS					_			
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;								
Attacks Against Post-Election Audit	0	0	1	5	10	85		
Types of threat vectors: Intentionally compromise auditors; Intentionally select audit samples non-randomly; Intentional modification of audit results; Intentional destruction of audit results;								
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE								
Errors in VRDB	0	0	1	80	10	10		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;								
Errors in Post-Election Audit	0	1	2	10	45	55		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental non-random selection of audit samples; Accidental modification of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental destruction of audit results;								
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	1	65	25	10		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	1	65	25	10		

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)					realized, time would , and high
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	1	65	25	10
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;						