THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted .	In the conte what percent think the the realized AN effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time but low as [min]	LIKELIHOC tot of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpre- "I think this t AND have an o ost likely] pero- t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	I election, me do you emost likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against VRDB	0	2	5	10	35	55	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;							
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	55	35	10	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);							
Attacks to Voting Access	0	0	1	35	55	10	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to send or misaddress registration form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to send or misaddress registration rejections; Intentional addition of confusing language on registration form and instructions; Intentional failure to provide login credentials and instructions to voters; Intentional corruption of login credentials and instructions provided to voters; Intentional addition of confusing information on voting interface;							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	55	45	10	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of registration activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of registration materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to register;							
Attacks Against Registration Forms and Instructions	0	0	2	5	20	75	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake registration forms and instructions;					-		

REAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> ompleted by: Election Expert 2 ata extracted .	In the cont what perce think the ti realized AN effect? Pro maximum of values a be realized effect in [n the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOC ext of a Federa ntage of the ti meat would be ID have an obs vide minimum values. Interpr s "I think this t AND have an nost likely] per it this estimate inimum] % and] %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable a and et this range hhreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	assuming the second s Second second s Second second s	IMPACT ext of a Feder he threat is re- entage of the w, medium, a umbers shou	ealized, time would and high
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	0	1	75	20	5
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms a instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;						
Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms	0	1	2	75	20	5
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack; Election webserver tampering; Coerced registration; Masqueraded registration; Vote buying; Pay voter r to vote; Ineligible registration;	ot					
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	0	0	1	75	20	5
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;	I					
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Registration Packets	0	0	2	10	55	35
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets at the LEO;						
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Rejections	0	0	1	70	25	5
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration rejections during transmission from LEO to the voters; LEO to the voters;						
UTSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	55	35	10
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);						
Attacks Against Voting Access	0	1	2	55	35	10
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack;						

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface, transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	think the threat would be most likely what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely what realized AND have an observable it has				VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with balloting via Web interface, transmission via the Internet, and automated tabulation In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT				IMPACT ext of a Feder he threat is re- ntage of the t w, medium, a umbers shou	ealized, time would and high
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High				
Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms	0	1	2	0	10	90				
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack; Election webserver tampering; Coerced registration; Masqueraded registration; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible registration;										
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS										
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE										
Errors in VRDB	0	1	5	20	40	40				
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;										
Errors in Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	65	25	10				
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);						-				
Errors in Registration Forms and Instructions	0	0	1	10	25	65				
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous registration forms and instructions;										
Errors in Processing Completed Registration Packets	0	0	1	10	25	65				
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO;										
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS										
Errors in Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	1	3	10	25	65				
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;										

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted .	In the conte what percer think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOO ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpr "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (number: n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable a and et this range threat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Errors in Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	0	1	3	10	25	65	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;			-				
Errors in Transmission of Registration Rejections	0	1	3	65	25	10	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters;							
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION							
Errors in Voting Access	0	2	5	65	25	10	
Types of threat vectors: Online access nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Difficulties with finding or logging in the election website; Election website ease-of-use and clarity;			-		=		
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	1	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;							
Errors in Registration Application	0	1	1	80	15	5	
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Registration packet incorrectly completed/signed; Registration packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;							

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min [maximum]	LIKELIHOOD In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	1	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

IREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what perce think the th realized AN effect? Pro- maximum V of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOO ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs vide minimum ralues. Interpr "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and [%." (number n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable a and threat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	1	0	5	90	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;					•		
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	0	1	97	3	0	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);			•				
Attacks to Voting Access	0	0	1	60	30	10	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to send or misaddress absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to send or misaddress absentee ballot request rejections; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballots; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of confusing language on instructions for marked ballot return; Intentional failure to provide login credentials and instructions to voters; Intentional corruption of login credentials and instructions provided to voters; Intentional addition of confusing information on voting interface;							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	0	10	90	
Types of threat vectors: Election webserver tampering; Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;							
Attacks Against Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	1	0	10	90	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions;							

HREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what percent think the the realized AN effect? Pro- maximum V of values as be realized effect in [m the time but low as [min]	LIKELIHOC ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs vide minimum ralues. Interpr "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (number: n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable a and et this range threat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal elect assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time w it have a low, medium, and hig impact? (numbers should sum 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	1	55	35	10	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;		-			-	-	
Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	2	55	35	10	
Types of threat vectors: Election webserver tampering;		-	-		-		
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	1	2	О	5	90	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;							
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	0	1	0	5	90	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;							
Attacks During Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	0	1	65	30	5	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake rejections of absentee ballot requests during transmission from LEO to the voters;							
Attacks Against Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	0	1	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballots and instructions;							

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what percent think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOC txt of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpr "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable a and et this range hhreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	65	30	5		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);								
Attacks Against Voting Access	0	1	2	35	55	10		
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	2	35	55	10		
Types of threat vectors: Election webserver tampering; Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;								
Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	2	35	60	5		
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack; Coerced absentee ballot request; Masqueraded absentee ballot request; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible absentee ballot request;								
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE								
Errors in VRDB	0	2	5	60	30	10		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;								
Errors in Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	65	30	5		
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);								

EAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> ompleted by: Election Expert 2 ata extracted .	In the conte what perce think the th realized AN effect? Pro- maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min [maximum]	LIKELIHOOD In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you hink the threat would be most likely ealized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as ow as [minimum] % and as high as maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			IMPACT ext of a Feder the threat is re- entage of the ow, medium, a numbers shou	ealized, time would and high
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Errors in Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	1	0	10	90
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions;					•	
Errors in Processing Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	0	1	0	10	90
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;		5				8
Errors in Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	0	1	0	10	90
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballots and instructions;						
RORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS						
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	1	90	10	0
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;						
Errors in Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	0	1	0	5	95
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;						
Errors in Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	0	1	95	5	0
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters;						

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with balloting via Web interface, transmission via the Internet, and automated tabulation Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what perce think the th realized AN effect? Pro- maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOO ext of a Federa ntage of the tii irreat would be D have an obs vide minimum values. Interpro- "I think this ti AND have an o iost likely] pero- ti this estimate imum] % and a [%." (numbers n to 100)	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable exent (%) of could be as as high as	IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION							
Errors in Voting Access	0	2	5	30	45	25	
Types of threat vectors: Online access nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Difficulties with finding or logging in the election website; Election website ease-of-use and clarity;							
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	0	1	95	5	0	
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;							
Errors in Absentee Ballot Requests	0	1	2	95	5	0	
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly completed/signed; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;							
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted .	In the conte what percent think the the realized ANI effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [muthe the time but low as [mini	LIKELIHOC text of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpro- "I think this ti AND have an o ost likely] perce tithis estimate timum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	I election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	by you assuming the threat is real t likely what percentage of the tim ole it have a low, medium, and impact? (numbers should s range 100) would veable %) of d be as th as				
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Election webserver tampering; Intentional disruption of absentee ballot transmission from the LEO to the voters;								
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	0	0	1	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballots and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;					-			
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Voting Access	0	1	2	10	55	35		
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	2	ο	75	25		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots from the LEO to the voters;		-						
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	0	1	2	О	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballots instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								

<u>b</u>	Electronic absentee voting system with <u>palloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>he Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> ection Expert 2	LIKELIHOOD In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			IMPACT In the context of a Federal electic assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time wou it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: A	BSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events		0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak	, ,							
Disruptions by Environmental Events		0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events		0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terroris	sm;							

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted .	In the conte what percent think the the realized AN effect? Prove maximum version of values as be realized effect in [m the time but low as [min]	LIKELIHOC ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs vide minimum ralues. Interpr "I think this t AND have an o ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum f 100)				
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS					_			
Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms	0	0	1	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Election webserver tampering;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms	0	1	2	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack; Coerced vote; Masqueraded vote; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible vote;								
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION								
Errors in Voting Access	0	2	5	65	30	5		
Types of threat vectors: Online access nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Difficulties with finding or logging in the election website; Election website ease-of-use and clarity;								
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	65	30	5		
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;								
Errors in Absentee Ballot Marking	0	0	1	35	55	10		
Types of threat vectors: Marked ballot packet incorrectly completed/signed; Absentee ballot damaged on webserver; Marked ballot packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO; Marked ballot packet not transmitted to LEO;			-		-			

	Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Election Expert 2	LIKELIHOOD In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			IMPACT In the context of a Federal electic assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time wor it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step	BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events		0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outb	eak;					•			
Disruptions by Environmental Events		0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;			-						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events		0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Ter	rorism;								

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what percent think the the realized AN effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time but low as [min [maximum]]	LIKELIHOOD IMPACT context of a Federal election, percentage of the time do you the threat would be most likely ed AND have an observable ? Provide minimum and num values. Interpret this range uses as "I think this threat would lized AND have an observeable in [most likely] percent (%) of me but this estimate could be as a [minimum] % and as high as mum] %." (numbers DO NOT to sum to 100)					
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots from voter to LEO;					<u> </u>		
Attacks During Transmission of Marked Ballots Packets	0	1	2	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from the voters during transmission for the voters dur							
OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks to Voting Access	0	1	2	35	55	10	
Types of threat vectors: Phishing attack;							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	2	35	55	10	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots;							
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS							
Errors in Transmission of Marked Ballot Packets	0	0	1	65	30	5	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from the voters during their transmission from the voters during the durin							

	Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> <u>the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> lection Expert 2	LIKELIHOOD In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %" (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step	MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events		0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outb	reak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events		0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;									
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events		0	0	1	85	10	5		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Ter	rorism;								

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting</u> <u>via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what perce think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	LIKELIHOC ext of a Federa ntage of the ti rreat would be D have an obs vide minimum ralues. Interpr s "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per it this estimat imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely servable and et this range threat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
TTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS		-			_			
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	1	0	5	95		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	5	35	60		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of processing of marked ballots at LEO;					33	00		
Attacks Against Processing of Returned Ballots	0	0	1	0	2	98		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;								
Attacks Against Tabulation	0	0	1	0	2	98		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional subversion of the counting process; Intentional subversion of the validation process; Intentional subversion of the tabulated results;								
Attacks Against Adjudication	0	1	2	10	70	20		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional refusal of legitimate ballots; Intentional acceptance of invalid ballots; Intentional misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	2	55	35	10		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of marked ballot processing and tabulation activities at LEO;								

IREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting</u> <u>via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via the Internet</u> , and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what percent think the the realized AN effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time but low as [min	LIKELIHOO ext of a Federa ntage of the tii reat would be D have an obs vide minimum alues. Interpre- "I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimato imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	al election, ime do you e most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum f 100)			
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
NTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE							
Errors in VRDB	0	0	1	5	20	75	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;							
Errors in Processing of Returned Ballots	0	0	1	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;					•		
Errors in Tabulation	0	1	5	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Errors in counting process; Errors in validation process; Accidental loss of tabulated results; Accidental destruction of tabulated results; errors in publication of tabulated results;							
Errors in Adjudication	0	1	5	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental refusal of legitimate ballots; Accidental acceptance of invalid ballots; Accidental misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;					Ŭ		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> the Internet, and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted .	In the conte what percent think the the realized AN effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time but low as [min]	LIKELIHOOD IMPACT In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you hink the threat would be most likely ealized AND have an observable offect? Provide minimum and naximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would he realized AND have an observeable offect in [most likely] percent (%) of he time but this estimate could be as now as [minimum] % and as high as maximum] %" (numbers DO NOT hered to sum to 100)					
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum Most Likely Maximum			Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS		1					
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	1	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;							
Attacks Against Post-Election Audit	0	1	1	0	5	95	
Types of threat vectors: Intentionally compromise auditors; Intentionally select audit samples non-randomly; Intentional modification of audit results; Intentional destruction of audit results;							
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE							
Errors in VRDB	0	1	1	40	55	5	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;							
Errors in Post-Election Audit	0	1	1	40	55	5	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental non-random selection of audit samples; Accidental modification of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental destruction of audit results;					•		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							

THREAT VECTORS VOTING SCENARIO: Electronic absentee voting system with <u>balloting via Web interface</u> , <u>transmission via</u> the Internet, and <u>automated tabulation</u> Completed by: Election Expert 2 Data extracted.	In the conte what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v. of values as be realized A effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	LIKELIHOO xt of a Federa tage of the til reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this til AND have an o ost likely] perc this estimate mum] % and a %." (numbers to 100)	l election, me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as				
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	1	85	10	5	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							