REAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>ompleted by: Election Expert 1</b>	what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized d	xt of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpro "I think this ti AND have an o	me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to					
ata extracted.	the time but low as [mini	ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers t to 100)	e could be as as high as	100)					
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
CKS									
ISIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;					· · · ·				
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);									
Attacks to Voting Access	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration rejections; Intentional addition of confusing language on registration form and instructions;									
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of registration activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of registration materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to register;									
Attacks Against Registration Forms and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake registration forms and instructions;									
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of the voters; Intentional additio									

HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT		
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>Data extracted</b> .	what percei think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [mi the time bu low as [min	ext of a Federa reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpri "I think this t AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	me do you e most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from transmission from transmission from tregistrating transmission from transmission from trans							
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Registration Packets	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets at the LEO;							
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Rejections	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration rejections during transmission from LEO to the voters;							
OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);							
Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms	0	5	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Coerced registration; Masqueraded registration; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible registration;							
INTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE							
Errors in VRDB	0	2	5	95	4	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;							
Errors in Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					-		

REAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>ompleted by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>ata extracted</b> .	what percent think the th realized ANI effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [most	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this t AND have an o ost likely] peri t this estimate	me do you emost likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of	assuming the what percent it have a lo	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
	-	imum] % and %." (numbers n to 100)	-					
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Errors in Registration Forms and Instructions	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous registration forms and instructions;								
Errors in Processing Completed Registration Packets	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO;					•			
RORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Errors in Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;					•			
Errors in Transmission of Registration Rejections	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters;					•			
RORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION					-	-		
Errors in Voting Access	0	2	5	95	4	1		
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of registration form and instructions;								
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	5	10	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;								
Errors in Registration Application	5	10	15	95	4	1		
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Registration packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Registration form lost or damaged; Registration packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D	IMPACT					
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u>	what percent think the th realized AN effect? Prov	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ride minimum	me do you most likely ervable and	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized,					
Completed by: Election Expert 1	of values as be realized	alues. Interpre "I think this the AND have an o	hreat would observeable	what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to					
Data extracted.	the time bu low as [min	ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers	e could be as as high as	impactr (numbers should sum to					
	need to sun	n to 100)							
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS									
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	2	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;									
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	2	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;									
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	2	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;									

EAT VECTORS	1	LIKELIHOC	D	ΙΜΡΑϹΤ				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>ata extracted</b> .	what percent think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	ext of a Federa ntage of the tin reat would be D have an obsi- vide minimum alues. Interpre- "I think this the AND have an o ost likely] pero- t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	me do you most likely ervable and et this range mreat would observeable cent (%) of c could be as as high as	assuming tl what perce it have a lo	In the context of a Federal electior assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time woul it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	Hig		
KS IDER ATTACKS						_		
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	3	97	2	-		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;								
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	0	0	3	97	2			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					•			
Attacks to Voting Access	0	0	3	97	2			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of return;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	3	97	2			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;								
Attacks Against Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions;								

HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D	ΙΜΡΑCΤ			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> Completed by: Election Expert 1 Data extracted.	what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [mu the time but low as [mini	ext of a Federa rtage of the tii reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpre "I think this tl AND have an q osst likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	me do you most likely ervable and et this range mreat would observeable cent (%) of c could be as as high as	assuming th what perce it have a lo	ext of a Feder ne threat is re ntage of the ' w, medium, a umbers shou	ealized, time would and high	
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;							
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	0	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;						-	
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	0	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;							
Attacks During Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake rejections of absentee ballot requests during transmission from LEO to the voters;							
Attacks Against Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballots and instructions;					-		
OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	0	1	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);							

HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT		
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>Data extracted.</b>	what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [mo the time but low as [mini [maximum]	xt of a Federa tage of the tii reat would be D have an obs ride minimum alues. Interpre "I think this tl AND have an q osst likely] pero to this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers	me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cost (%) of e could be as as high as	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	need to sum Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;							
Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	2	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Coerced absentee ballot request; Masqueraded absentee ballot request; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible absentee ballot request;							
NINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE		-					
Errors in VRDB	0	0	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;							
Errors in Voter's Assistance	0	2	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);							
Errors in Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions;							
Errors in Processing Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	1	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;							
Errors in Absentee Ballots and Instructions	0	3	15	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballots and instructions;							

EAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>ompleted by: Election Expert 1</b> ata extracted.	what percent think the thin realized ANI effect? Prov maximum va of values as be realized A effect in [most the time but low as [mini	xt of a Federa ntage of the til reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this tl AND have an q osst likely] pero t this estimate mum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	me do you most likely ervable and et this range mreat would observeable cent (%) of c could be as as high as	assuming the what perce what perce it have a lo	In the context of a Federal elect assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time wo it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
RORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS								
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Errors in Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Errors in Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
RORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION								
Errors in Voting Access	0	1	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot request form and instructions;								
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>Data extracted.</b>	what percent think the th realized AN effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min]	xt of a Federa httage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this ti AND have an o sost likely] pero to this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	assuming th what perce it have a low	ext of a Feder he threat is re ntage of the f w, medium, a umbers shoul	ealized, time would and high
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Errors in Absentee Ballot Requests	0	3	10	97	2	1
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request form; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot request form lost or damaged; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;						_
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	2	97	2	1
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;						
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	2	97	2	1
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	2	97	2	1
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;						

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT		
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b>	what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as	xt of a Federa tage of the tin reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this th	me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would	assuming th what percer	ext of a Federa le threat is rea ntage of the t v, medium, ai	alized, ime would	
Data extracted.	effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate mum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	cent (%) of could be as as high as	impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS		-					
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	3				
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;					··		
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballots and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;							
OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;							
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS							
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;							
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	3	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b>	what percent think the th realized ANI effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [most	xt of a Federa ntage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpro "I think this ti AND have an o ost likely] pero	me do you most likely ervable and et this range mreat would observeable cent (%) of	In the context of a Federal election assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Data extracted.	low as [mini [maximum]	t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers	as high as					
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	need to sun Minimum		Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;		J			2	-		
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

REAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		ІМРАСТ			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>ompleted by: Election Expert 1</b> ata extracted.	what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [mu the time but low as [mini	xt of a Federa ttage of the til reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this th AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers n to 100)	me do you most likely ervable and et this range meat would observeable cent (%) of could be as as high as	assuming th what perce it have a low	ext of a Feder he threat is re ntage of the t w, medium, a umbers shoul	ealized, time would and high		
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ICKS								
DUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Coerced vote; Masqueraded vote; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible vote;								
TENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
RRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION								
Errors in Voting Access	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot and instructions;								
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	0	2	10	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;								
Errors in Absentee Ballot Marking	2	5	10	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Marked ballot packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot lost or damaged; Marked ballot packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO; Marked ballot packet not transmitted to LEO;								
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								

THREAT VECTORS		.IKELIHOC	D	ІМРАСТ				
restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b>	what percer think the thi realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized <i>J</i> effect in [mo the time but low as [mini [maximum]	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %" (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			In the context of a Federal electrony assuming the threat is realized what percentage of the time v it have a low, medium, and hig impact? (numbers should sum as			
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

THREAT VECTORS	L	.IKELIHOO	DD		IMPACT		
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u>	what percer think the th realized ANI effect? Prov maximum v	D have an ob 'ide minimun alues. Interp	time do you e most likely servable	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high			
Completed by: Election Expert 1 Data extracted.	be realized a effect in [mo the time bu low as [mini	AND have an ost likely] per t this estimat imum] % and %." (number	observeable rcent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a lov impact? (ni 100)	0		
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS INSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	1	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots from voter to LEO;							
Attacks During Transmission of Marked Ballots Packets	0	1	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from LEO to the voters; LeO to the voters;							
OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	3	5	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots;							
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS							
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS							
Errors in Transmission of Marked Ballot Packets	0	5	10	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters;							
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	2	97	2	1	
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							

THREAT VECTORS	L	IKELIHOO	DD		ІМРАСТ			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component Completed by: Election Expert 1 Data extracted.	what percei think the th realized AN effect? Prov maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	D have an ob vide minimun ralues. Interp . "I think this AND have an ost likely] pe t this estimat imum] % and	time do you e most likely servable n and ret this range threat would observeable rcent (%) of re could be as a shigh as	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	need to sun	%." (number n to 100) Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium High			
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;		-						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by postal</u> <u>mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u>	what perce think the th realized AN effect? Prov	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti ireat would be D have an obs vide minimum ralues. Interpro	me do you e most likely ervable and	assuming t	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized,			
Completed by: Election Expert 1 Data extracted.	of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	"I think this t AND have an ost likely] per t this estimate imum] % and %." (numbers	hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	it have a lo	at percentage of the time woul ave a low, medium, and high act? (numbers should sum to )			
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ATTACKS								
INSIDER ATTACKS		1						
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of processing of marked ballots at LEO;								
Attacks Against Processing of Returned Ballots	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets at the LEO;								
Attacks Against Tabulation	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional subversion of the counting process; Intentional subversion of the validation process; Intentional destruction of tabulated results; Intentional subversion of the tabulated results;								
Attacks Against Adjudication	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional refusal of legitimate ballots; Intentional acceptance of invalid ballots; Intentional misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	90	7	3		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of marked ballot processing and tabulation activities at LEO;								

REAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by postal</u> <u>mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>ata extracted</b> .	what perce think the th realized AN effect? Pro- maximum v of values as be realized effect in [m the time bu low as [min	ext of a Federa ntage of the ti nreat would be ID have an obse vide minimum values. Interpro- s "I think this t AND have an o nost likely] per at this estimato nimum] % and ] %." (numbers m to 100)	me do you e most likely servable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	assuming the what percent of the what percent	In the context of a Federal elect assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time wo it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum 100)			
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
TENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS								
RRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE								
Errors in VRDB	0	2	5	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;								
Errors in Processing of Returned Ballots	0	5	10	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;								
Errors in Tabulation	0	5	10	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Errors in counting process; Errors in validation process; Accidental loss of tabulated results; Accidental destruction of tabulated results; Errors in publication of tabulated results;								
Errors in Adjudication	0	5	10	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental refusal of legitimate ballots; Accidental acceptance of invalid ballots; Accidental misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;								
CCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	2	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		ІМРАСТ				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u>	what percer think the the realized ANI effect? Prov maximum va	xt of a Federa ntage of the til reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpre "I think this tl	me do you most likely ervable and et this range	In the context of a Federal electior assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time woul it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)					
Completed by: Election Expert 1 Data extracted.	effect in [mo the time but low as [mini	AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate mum] % and a %." (numbers to 100)	cent (%) of could be as as high as						
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
ATTACKS									
INSIDER ATTACKS									
Attacks Against VRDB	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;									
Attacks Against Post-Election Audit	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentionally compromise auditors; Intentionally select audit samples non-randomly; Intentional modification of audit results; Intentional destruction of audit results;									
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS									
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE									
Errors in VRDB	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;									
Errors in Post-Election Audit	0	0	3	97	2	1			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental non-random selection of audit samples; Accidental modification of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental destruction of audit results;									

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		ІМРАСТ			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by</u> <u>postal mail</u> , with <u>no electronic component</u> <b>Completed by: Election Expert 1</b> <b>Data extracted.</b>	what percent think the th realized ANI effect? Prove maximum v of values as be realized a effect in [mini- the time bur low as [mini-	xt of a Federa htage of the ti reat would be D have an obs ide minimum alues. Interpru- "I think this ti AND have an o ost likely] pero t this estimate imum] % and a %." (numbers to 10)	me do you most likely ervable and et this range hreat would observeable cent (%) of e could be as as high as	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)				
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum		Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;					-			
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events	0	0	3	97	2	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;					•			