

Federal Voting Assistance Program
 Comparative Risk Analysis of the Current UOCAVA Voting System and an Electronic Alternative Report
 Risk Analysis Questionnaire for the Current UOCAVA Voting System

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD			IMPACT		
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by postal mail</u>, with <u>no electronic component</u>	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)		
Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 3. Data extracted.						
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
ATTACKS	INSIDER ATTACKS					
Attacks Against VRDB Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;	0	0	1	5	25	70
Attacks to Voter's Assistance Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);	0	0	1	5	25	70
Attacks to Voting Access Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration rejections; Intentional addition of confusing language on registration form and instructions;	0	0	2	5	25	70
Attacks by Denial of Service Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of registration activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of registration materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to register;	0	0	1	5	20	75
Attacks Against Registration Forms and Instructions Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake registration forms and instructions;	0	0	1	5	25	70
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;	0	0	1	5	25	70

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<p>Attacks During Transmission of Completed Registration Packets</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;</p>	0	0	2	5	25	70
<p>Attacks Against Processing of Completed Registration Packets</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets at the LEO;</p>	0	0	1	5	25	70
<p>Attacks During Transmission of Registration Rejections</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration rejections during transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	0	0	1	5	50	45
OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
<p>Attacks Against Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);</p>	0	1	2	25	50	25
<p>Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Coerced registration; Masqueraded registration; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible registration;</p>	1	1	2	25	25	50

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UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
<p>Errors in VRDB</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);</p>	5	25	30	50	25	25
<p>Errors in Registration Forms and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous registration forms and instructions;</p>	1	5	10	50	25	25
<p>Errors in Processing Completed Registration Packets</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS						
<p>Errors in Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25

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<p>Errors in Transmission of Completed Registration Packets</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Transmission of Registration Rejections</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	1	3	5	25	25	50
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION						
<p>Errors in Voting Access</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of registration form and instructions;</p>	30	50	70	5	40	45
<p>Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;</p>	1	5	7	90	5	5
<p>Errors in Registration Application</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Registration packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Registration form lost or damaged; Registration packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;</p>	10	30	50	25	50	25
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98
<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5

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ATTACKS						
INSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks Against VRDB Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;	0	0	1	5	25	70
Attacks to Voter's Assistance Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);	0	0	1	5	25	70
Attacks to Voting Access Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request rejections; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballots; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of confusing language on instructions for marked ballot return;	0	0	2	5	25	70
Attacks by Denial of Service Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;	0	0	1	5	20	75
Attacks Against Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions;	0	0	1	5	20	75

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Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST						
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;	0	0	2	5	20	75
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;	0	0	2	5	20	75
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;	0	0	1	5	20	75
Attacks During Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake rejections of absentee ballot requests during transmission from LEO to the voters;	0	0	1	5	50	45
Attacks Against Absentee Ballots and Instructions Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballots and instructions;	0	0	1	5	50	45

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OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
<p>Attacks Against Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);</p>	0	1	2	25	50	25
<p>Attacks by Denial of Service</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;</p>	0	1	2	25	25	50
<p>Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Coerced absentee ballot request; Masqueraded absentee ballot request; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible absentee ballot request;</p>	1	1	2	25	25	50
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
<p>Errors in VRDB</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);</p>	5	25	30	50	25	25
<p>Errors in Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions;</p>	1	5	10	75	25	25

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<p>Errors in Processing Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;</p>	1	5	10	75	25	25
<p>Errors in Absentee Ballots and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballots and instructions;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS						
<p>Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	1	5	15	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;</p>	1	5	15	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	1	3	5	5	50	45
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION						
<p>Errors in Voting Access</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot request form and instructions;</p>	30	50	70	5	40	45

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<p>Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;</p>	1	5	7	90	5	5
<p>Errors in Absentee Ballot Requests</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request form; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot request form lost or damaged; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;</p>	10	30	50	25	50	25
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98
<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5

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ATTACKS						
INSIDER ATTACKS						
<p>Attacks by Denial of Service</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;</p>	0	0	1	50	25	25
<p>Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballots and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	0	0	1	25	50	25
OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
<p>Attacks by Denial of Service</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;</p>	0	0	1	50	25	25
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS						
<p>Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;</p>	25	30	50	50	25	25
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98

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<p align="center">Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 3. Data extracted.</p>						
<p align="center">Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY</p>	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5

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ATTACKS						
OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
<p>Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Coerced vote; Masqueraded vote; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible vote;</p>	0	2	5	50	25	25
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION						
<p>Errors in Voting Access</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot and instructions;</p>	30	50	70	5	40	45
<p>Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;</p>	1	5	7	90	5	5
<p>Errors in Absentee Ballot Marking</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Marked ballot packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot lost or damaged; Marked ballot packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO; Marked ballot packet not transmitted to LEO;</p>	10	30	50	25	25	50
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98
<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90

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THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD			IMPACT		
<p align="center">VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by postal mail</u>, with <u>no electronic component</u></p>	<p>In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)</p>			<p>In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)</p>		
<p align="center">Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 3. Data extracted.</p>						
<p align="center">Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING</p>	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5

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<p style="text-align: center;">VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by postal mail</u>, with <u>no electronic component</u></p> <p style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em; text-align: center;">Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 3. Data extracted.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN</p>	<p>In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)</p>			<p>In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)</p>		
ATTACKS	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
INSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	10	10	80
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots from voter to LEO;						
Attacks During Transmission of Marked Ballots Packets	0	0	1	10	10	80
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from LEO to the voters;						
OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks by Denial of Service	0	0	1	20	20	60
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots;						
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS						
Errors in Transmission of Marked Ballot Packets	30	40	50	10	10	80
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters;						

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<p align="center">VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to <u>paper ballots transmitted by postal mail</u>, with <u>no electronic component</u></p> <p align="center">Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 3. Data extracted.</p> <p align="center">Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN</p>	<p>In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)</p>			<p>In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)</p>		
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98
<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5

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	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)					
Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 3. Data extracted.	Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION			Low	Medium	High
	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum			
ATTACKS						
INSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks Against VRDB Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;	0	0	1	25	50	25
Attacks by Denial of Service Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of processing of marked ballots at LEO;	0	1	2	80	10	10
Attacks Against Processing of Returned Ballots Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets at the LEO;	0	0	1	1	1	98
Attacks Against Tabulation Types of threat vectors: Intentional subversion of the counting process; Intentional subversion of the validation process; Intentional destruction of tabulated results; Intentional subversion of the tabulated results;	0	0	1	1	1	98
Attacks Against Adjudication Types of threat vectors: Intentional refusal of legitimate ballots; Intentional acceptance of invalid ballots; Intentional misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;	0	5	10	50	25	25
OUTSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks by Denial of Service Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of marked ballot processing and tabulation activities at LEO;	0	1	2	80	10	10

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UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
<p>Errors in VRDB</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Processing of Returned Ballots</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;</p>	1	3	5	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Tabulation</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Errors in counting process; Errors in validation process; Accidental loss of tabulated results; Accidental destruction of tabulated results; Errors in publication of tabulated results;</p>	1	2	3	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Adjudication</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental refusal of legitimate ballots; Accidental acceptance of invalid ballots; Accidental misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;</p>	1	3	5	50	25	25
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98
<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5

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ATTACKS						
INSIDER ATTACKS						
<p>Attacks Against VRDB</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;</p>	0	0	1	25	50	25
<p>Attacks Against Post-Election Audit</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Intentionally compromise auditors; Intentionally select audit samples non-randomly; Intentional modification of audit results; Intentional destruction of audit results;</p>	0	0	1	10	80	10
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
<p>Errors in VRDB</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;</p>	1	5	10	25	50	25
<p>Errors in Post-Election Audit</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Accidental non-random selection of audit samples; Accidental modification of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental destruction of audit results;</p>	0	1	2	20	60	20
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS						
<p>Disruptions by Natural Events</p> <p>Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;</p>	0	1	3	1	1	98

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<p>Disruptions by Environmental Events Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;</p>	0	3	5	5	5	90
<p>Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;</p>	3	5	7	90	5	5