HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Jay Aceto, RedPhone Data extracted.	what perc think the t realized effect? maximum of values a be realized effect in [t the time but low as [m	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have an or values. Interpris s "I think this" AND have an most likely] pe at this estimat inimum] % an m] %." (number	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable ercent (%) of the could be as ind as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce it have a l	ext of a Feder the threat is ntage of the low, medium, numbers shou 100)	realized, time would and high		
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	ed to sum to	100) Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
ITACKS	William	WOST LIKELY	Wiaximum		Wiediuiii			
INSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against VRDB	25	99	100	98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;								
Attacks to Voter's Assistance	25	99	100	100	0	0		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);								
Attacks to Voting Access	25	99	100	98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress registration rejections; Intentional addition of confusing language on registration form and instructions;								
Attacks by Denial of Service	25	99	100	100	0	0		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of registration activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of registration materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to register;					,			
Attacks Against Registration Forms and Instructions	25	99	100	100	0	0		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake registration forms and instructions;								
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	25	99	100	96	2	2		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;								

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D		IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	what perc think the t realized effect? maximum	text of a Fede entage of the hreat would b AND have and Provide mining values. Interpres	time do you e most likely observable mum and ret this range	assuming what perce	ext of a Feder the threat is	realized, time would		
Completed by: Jay Aceto, RedPhone Data extracted.	effect in [I the time bu low as [m [maximul	AND have an most likely] pe ut this estimat inimum] % an m] %." (numbed to sum to	ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT		low, medium numbers sho 100)			
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	25	99	100	94	4	2		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Registration Packets	25	99	100	96	2	2		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed registration packets at the LEO;								
Attacks During Transmission of Registration Rejections	25	99	100	98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake registration rejections during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
OUTSIDER ATTACKS								
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance	25	99	100	98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);								
Attacks Against Marking of Registration Forms	25	99	100	98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Coerced registration; Masqueraded registration; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible registration;								

HREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	DD		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable				realized, time would , and high	
Completed by: Jay Aceto, RedPhone Data extracted.	effect in [I the time bu low as [m [maximul	nost likely] po	ercent (%) of te could be as nd as high as ers DO NOT	impact? (	numbers sho 100)	uld sum to
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
INTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS						
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE						
Errors in VRDB	25	99	100	96	2	2
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;			•		•	
Errors in Voter's Assistance	25	99	100	96	2	2
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);						
Errors in Registration Forms and Instructions	25	99	100	96	2	2
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of registration forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous registration forms and instructions;						
Errors in Processing Completed Registration Packets	25	99	100	98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets at the LEO;						
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS						
Errors in Transmission of Registration Forms and Instructions	25	99	100	98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;						
Errors in Transmission of Completed Registration Packets	25	99	100	98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed registration packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;						

THREAT VECTORS	ı	LIKELIHOO	D	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Jay Aceto, RedPhone Data extracted.	what perce think the the realized and effect? maximum who of values as be realized effect in [note that the time but low as [min]	S "I think this AND have an nost likely] pe	time do you be most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable ercent (%) of the could be as and as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce it have a	ext of a Fede the threat is ntage of the low, medium numbers sho 100)	realized, time would , and high		
Voting Step: REGISTRATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Errors in Transmission of Registration Rejections	25	99	100	98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of registration rejections during their transmission from LEO to the voters;								
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION								
Errors in Voting Access	25	99	100	96	2	2		
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of registration form and instructions;								
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance	25	99	100	94	4	2		
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;								
Errors in Registration Application	25	99	100	94	4	2		
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Registration packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Registration form lost or damaged; Registration packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;								
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS								
Disruptions by Natural Events				98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;								
Disruptions by Environmental Events				98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;								
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events				98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;								

REAT VECTORS	L	IKELIHOC	D		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would			g the threat is	realized,	
Completed by: Cyber Security Exper	be realized effect in [r the time ku low as [rni [maximur	AND have an nost likely] pe	observeable ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT		low, medium numbers sho 100)	_
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
ACKS						
NSIDER ATTACKS						
Attacks Against VRDB				98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;						
Attacks to Voter's Assistance				98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious insiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);					•	
Attacks to Voting Access				98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballot request rejections; Intentional failure at LEO to mail or misaddress absentee ballots; Intentional addition of confusing language on absentee ballot request form and instructions; Intentional addition of confusing language on instructions for marked ballot return;						
Attacks by Denial of Service				98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;						
Attacks Against Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions				99	1	0
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions;						

HREAT VECTORS	L	IKELIHOO	D	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range what percentage of				the threat is	realized,		
Completed by: Cyber Security Exper 2. Data extracted.	be realized a effect in [m the time but low as [rnii [maximum	"I think this t AND have an nost likely] pe t this estimate nimum] % and n] %." (numbe ed to sum to 2	observeable ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT	it have a	low, medium numbers sho 100)	, and high		
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions				96	4	0		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballot request forms and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Attacks During Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets				96	4	0		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets during transmission from the voters to the LEO;								
Attacks Against Processing of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets				98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;								
Attacks During Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests				96	4	0		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake rejections of absentee ballot requests during transmission from LEO to the voters;								
Attacks Against Absentee Ballots and Instructions				98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional destruction at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Intentional addition at LEO of fake absentee ballots and instructions;	•							

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Exper 2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [rninimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low Medium High
OUTSIDER ATTACKS		
Attacks Against Voter's Assistance		98 2 0
Types of threat vectors: Intentional corruption by malicious outsiders of information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);		
Attacks by Denial of Service		98 2 0
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of absentee ballot request activities at LEO; Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballot request materials; Intentional disruption of voter's ability to request an absentee ballot;		
Attacks Against Marking of Absentee Ballot Requests		98 1 1
Types of threat vectors: Coerced absentee ballot request; Masqueraded absentee ballot request; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible absentee ballot request;		
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS		
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE		
Errors in VRDB		98 1 1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;		
Errors in Voter's Assistance		98 1 1
Types of threat vectors: Erroneous information provided to voters (omission, false or incomplete statement, outdated information);		
Errors in Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions		98 1 1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental destruction at LEO of absentee ballot request forms and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballot request forms and instructions;		

HREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOO	D		IMPACT	
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Exper 2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Fede what percentage of the think the threat would b realized AND have an effect? Provide minimaximum values. Interprof values as "I think this be realized AND have an effect in [most likely] pethe time but this estimat low as [rninimum] % an [maximum] %." (numbered to sum to a support of the support of	time do you e most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would observeable ercent (%) of e could be as d as high as ers DO NOT	assuming what perce it have a l	ext of a Feder of the threat is intage of the low, medium numbers sho 100)	realized, time would , and high
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High
Errors in Processing Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets			98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets at the LEO;					
Errors in Absentee Ballots and Instructions			98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental loss at LEO of absentee ballots and instructions; Accidental addition at LEO of erroneous absentee ballots and instructions;					
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS					
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot Request Forms and Instructions			98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballot request forms and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;					
Errors in Transmission of Completed Absentee Ballot Request Packets			98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental loss of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO; Accidental destruction of completed absentee ballot request packets during their transmission from the voters to the LEO;					
Errors in Transmission of Rejections of Absentee Ballot Requests			98	1	1
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of rejections of absentee ballot requests during their transmission from LEO to the voters;					
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION					

THREAT VECTORS	L	IKELIHOC	D	IMPACT					
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Compolerted by: Cyber Security Experi	what perce think the th realized A effect? maximum v of values as	"I think this	time do you e most likely observable mum and ret this range threat would	assuming what perce	ext of a Feder the threat is entage of the low, medium	realized, time would			
Completed by: Cyber Security Exper- 2. Data extracted.	be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [rninimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)				numbers sho 100)	_			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	Minimum		Maximum	Low	Medium	High			
Errors in Voting Access				96	3	1			
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot request form and instructions;									

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD		IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Experience.  2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election what percentage of the time do think the threat would be most listed AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this rest of values as "I think this threat where the realized AND have an observe effect in [most likely] percent (% the time but this estimate could be low as [minimum] % and as high	you kely ble I ange ould able ) of	assuming what perce it have a le	ext of a Feder the threat is ntage of the ow, medium numbers sho 100)	realized, time would , and high		
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST	[maximum] %." (numbers DO N need to sum to 100)  Minimum Most Likely Maxim	ОТ	Low	Medium	High		
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance			96	3	1		
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;							
Errors in Absentee Ballot Requests			98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Incorrect contact information provided to LEO; Accidental loss of absentee ballot request form; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot request form lost or damaged; Absentee ballot request packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO;	. ,						
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS							
Disruptions by Natural Events			98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;							
Disruptions by Environmental Events			98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events			98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT		
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component postal mail, with no electronic component effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable be realized AND have an observeable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect?			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low Medium High		
ATTACKS				
INSIDER ATTACKS				
Attacks by Denial of Service		98 1 1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;				
Attacks During Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions		98 1 1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake absentee ballots and instructions during transmission from LEO to the voters;				
OUTSIDER ATTACKS				
Attacks by Denial of Service		98 1 1		
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of absentee ballots;		<u> </u>		
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS				
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS				
Errors in Transmission of Absentee Ballot and Instructions		98 1 1		
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of absentee ballots and instructions during their transmission from LEO to the voters;				
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS				
Disruptions by Natural Events		98 1 1		
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;				

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values; as "I think this threat would	ext of a Fede g the threat is entage of the low, medium	realized, time would			
2. Data extracted.	be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)		numbers sho			
Voting Step: ABSENTEE BALLOT DELIVERY	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Environmental Events		98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;						
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events		98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;			•	•		

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)				
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low Medium High			
ATTACKS					
OUTSIDER ATTACKS					
Attacks Against Marking Absentee Ballots and Forms		98 2 0			
Types of threat vectors: Coerced vote; Masqueraded vote; Vote buying; Pay voter not to vote; Ineligible vote;					
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS					
ERRORS AT VOTER'S LOCATION					
Errors in Voting Access		98 2 0			
Types of threat vectors: Mail service nonexistent, irregular and/or unreliable; Ease-of-use and clarity of absentee ballot and instructions;					
Errors in Obtaining Voter's Assistance		95 3 2			
Types of threat vectors: Contact wrong LEO; Being unaware of voter's assistance resources; Putting trust in unvetted third-party resources;	, ,	, ,			
Errors in Absentee Ballot Marking		95 3 2			
Types of threat vectors: Marked ballot packet incorrectly or illegibly completed/signed; Absentee ballot lost or damaged; Marked ballot packet incorrectly transmitted to LEO; Marked ballot packet not transmitted to LEO;	'	•			
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS					
Disruptions by Natural Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;					
Disruptions by Environmental Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;	! !	: :			

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT				
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range					
Voting Step: BALLOT MARKING	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low	Medium	High		
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events		98	1	1		
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;	•					

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	need to sum to 100)  Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low Medium High			
ATTACKS					
INSIDER ATTACKS					
Attacks by Denial of Service		80 10 10			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots from voter to LEO;					
Attacks During Transmission of Marked Ballots Packets		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets during transmission from LEO to the voters;					
OUTSIDER ATTACKS					
Attacks by Denial of Service  Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of transmission of marked ballots;		85 10 5			
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS					
ERRORS DURING TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION MATERIALS					
Errors in Transmission of Marked Ballot Packets		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets during their transmission from LEO to the voters;	•				
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS					
Disruptions by Natural Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;					

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD			IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would			In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized,			
Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	effect in [m	be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as			it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)		
z. Data extracted.	the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)						
Voting Step: MARKED BALLOT RETURN	Minimum I	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Disruptions by Environmental Events				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							

THREAT VECTORS		LIKELIHOC	D	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range			In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized,			
Completed by: Cyber Security Expert  2. Data extracted.	of values as be realized effect in [r the time bu low as [mi [maximur	s "I think this AND have an most likely] pe	threat would observeable ercent (%) of the could be as and as high as ers DO NOT	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to			
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
ATTACKS							
INSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks Against VRDB				95	5	0	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;							
Attacks by Denial of Service				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of processing of marked ballots at LEO;							
Attacks Against Processing of Returned Ballots				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Intentional addition of fake marked ballot packets at the LEO;					•		
Attacks Against Tabulation				96	2	2	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional subversion of the counting process; Intentional subversion of the validation process; Intentional destruction of tabulated results; Intentional subversion of the tabulated results;							
Attacks Against Adjudication				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional refusal of legitimate ballots; Intentional acceptance of invalid ballots; Intentional misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;							
OUTSIDER ATTACKS							
Attacks by Denial of Service				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Intentional disruption of marked ballot processing and tabulation activities at LEO;							

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert  2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)	In the context of a Federal election, assuming the threat is realized, what percentage of the time would it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: RETURNED BALLOT PROCESSING & TABULATION	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low Medium High			
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS					
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE					
Errors in VRDB		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;					
Errors in Processing of Returned Ballots		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental destruction of marked ballot packets at the LEO; Accidental loss of marked ballot packets at the LEO;		1			
Errors in Tabulation		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Errors in counting process; Errors in validation process; Accidental loss of tabulated results; Accidental destruction of tabulated results; Errors in publication of tabulated results;		•			
Errors in Adjudication		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental refusal of legitimate ballots; Accidental acceptance of invalid ballots; Accidental misapplication of rules for determining voter's intent;		,			
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS					
Disruptions by Natural Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;					
Disruptions by Environmental Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;					
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;					

THREAT VECTORS	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range	In the context of a Federal election,			
Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)	it have a low, medium, and high impact? (numbers should sum to 100)			
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum Most Likely Maximum	Low Medium High			
ATTACKS					
INSIDER ATTACKS					
Attacks Against VRDB		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentional modification of registration records; Intentional destruction of registration records; Intentional addition of fake registration records; VRDB intentional crash;					
Attacks Against Post-Election Audit		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Intentionally compromise auditors; Intentionally select audit samples non-randomly; Intentional modification of audit results; Intentional destruction of audit results;					
UNINTENTIONAL DISRUPTIONS					
ERRORS AT LOCAL ELECTION OFFICE					
Errors in VRDB		95 3 2			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental modification of registration records; Accidental loss of registration records; Accidental destruction of registration records; Accidental addition of erroneous registration records; VRDB accidental crash;					
Errors in Post-Election Audit		95 3 2			
Types of threat vectors: Accidental non-random selection of audit samples; Accidental modification of audit results; Accidental loss of audit results; Accidental destruction of audit results;	•				
ACCIDENTAL DISRUPTIONS					
Disruptions by Natural Events		98 1 1			
Types of threat vectors: Weather-related; Earthquake; Outbreak;		•			

THREAT VECTORS	LI	KELIHOO	D	IMPACT			
VOTING SCENARIO: Current UOCAVA absentee voting system, restricted to paper ballots transmitted by postal mail, with no electronic component  Completed by: Cyber Security Expert 2. Data extracted.	In the context of a Federal election, what percentage of the time do you think the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and maximum values. Interpret this range of values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observeable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as low as [minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT need to sum to 100)			what percentage of the time do you mink the threat would be most likely realized AND have an observable effect? Provide minimum and aximum values. Interpret this range f values as "I think this threat would be realized AND have an observable effect in [most likely] percent (%) of the time but this estimate could be as ow as  minimum] % and as high as [maximum] %." (numbers DO NOT			
Voting Step: POST-ELECTION AUDIT	Minimum I	Most Likely	Maximum	Low	Medium	High	
Disruptions by Environmental Events				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Fire; Spill; Flooding;							
Disruptions by Human-Created Collateral Events				98	1	1	
Types of threat vectors: Technical failure; Labor-related; Terrorism;							